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INCENTIVES IN THE WELFARE-STATE
1
- Lessons for would-be welfare states -
This paper deals with economic incentives and welfare-state
arrangements in OECD countries; it also offers some lessons for would-
be welfare states. These arrangements differ, of course, among OECD
countries. In particular, there is wide variation in the extent to which
countries rely on four basic institutions - the state, the firm, the family
and the market. Countries also differ in their reliance on (i) a common
safety net, often in the form of flat-rate benefits tied to specific
contingencies; (ii) means-tested benefits for low-income groups; and (iii)
income protection, i.e., benefits that are tied to previous income. Another
distinction is between corporatist welfare states, where benefits are tied
to labor contracts, and universal welfare states in which benefits are
conditional on residence or citizenship. This distinction is blurred,
however, by recent tendencies in corporatist welfare states to extend
coverage to individuals who have very weak attachment to the labor
market, and in universal welfare states to tie benefits to previous or
contemporary work under the slogan “workfare” rather than “welfare”.
The degree of generosity of benefits is another important
distinction. Of course, the lower the benefit levels, the stronger the
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incentives for citizens to opt for voluntary (market) solutions, in the form
of private saving and private insurance arrangements.
When considering incentive problems in connection with various
types of welfare-state arrangements, this paper emphasizes what may be
called "dynamic" issues, i.e., incentive effects that evolve over time.
These also include endogenous changes in social norms among
individuals and endogenous adjustments in political behavior. This
approach also makes it necessary to broaden the analysis to fields outside
conventionally defined “economic analysis”.  Let me begin, however,
with some more familiar "static" aspects.
I. Static aspects
The most obvious achievements of the modern welfare state are
probably (i) to redistribute income over the life cycle of the individual,
and in this context equalize the distribution of yearly income between
individuals and households; (ii) to reduce income risk; (iii) to stimulate
the consumption of various social services, often with strong elements of
investment in human capital; and (iv) to mitigate poverty. In some
countries, welfare-state arrangements may also (v) equalize the overall
distribution of disposable lifetime income, i.e., wealth, among
individuals, as well as the distribution of specific social services. This
enumeration illustrates the common view that welfare-state arrangements
may be motivated on both efficiency grounds (the first three
achievements just mentioned) and distributional grounds (the last two).
How, then, can we be sure that more or less the same efficiency
gains would not have taken place without welfare-state arrangements,
i.e., on a voluntary basis? The “paternalistic” answer, of course, is that
many individuals are myopic, and that they would therefore not have
chosen equally elaborate economic security on their own. Economists,3
however, usually emphasize various deficiencies of voluntary market
solutions to problems of economic security; the most obvious are perhaps
difficulties in borrowing with human capital as collateral and the high
administrative costs of voluntary insurance policies. Compulsory social
security is, as we know, also motivated as (i) a way to overcome
tendencies towards free-riding by individuals who expect the government
to help them if they encounter difficulties; (ii) a method to prevent
"cream-skimming" by insurance companies if they are able to identify
high-risk individuals; and (iii) a technique to avoid adverse selection
when insurance companies are not able to make such identification.
There is also general agreement among economists that various positive
externalities of investment in human capital tend to make such
investment suboptimal, and that these problems may be mitigated by
government loan guarantees and subsidies to education.
But how do we know that welfare-state arrangements, in fact, also
equalize the distribution of disposable income among individuals? One
piece of evidence is that the dispersion of disposable income in most
OECD countries is much smaller than the dispersion of factor income -
and that this holds for the overall income distribution as well as for its
lower tail.
2 The weak point of this evidence is, of course, that it neglects
                                          
2 While the Gini coefficient for the overall distribution of yearly factor income of
households is typically about 0.40-0.45 in the rich OECD countries, it is usually in the interval of
0.20-0.30 in the case of yearly disposable (i.e., post-tax post-transfer) income (Mitchell, 1991,
p.127). Suppose that the "poverty line" is drawn at 40 percent of median income. and that the
“poverty gap” is defined as the aggregate amount of income that would have to be given to
households below the poverty line in order to bring their income up to this line.  The relevant
amount is typically 3.0-5.0 percent of GNP in most OECD countries in the case of factor income.  In
the case of disposable income, the corresponding amount is as low as 0.1-1.2 percent of GNP
(Mitchell, 1991, pp. 57 and 75).
The figures refer to yearly income.  We know less about the difference between the
distribution of factor income and disposable income on a lifetime income basis.  In the case of
Sweden, however, it turns out that policy-induced differences between these distributions have
prevailed for quite long periods, indeed for as long as 19 years (Björklund, Palme and Svensson,
1995).  Moreover, the difference in lifetime factor-income and disposable income for well-defined
careers is quite large in Sweden (Lindbeck, 1983).  This holds in spite of the fact that about 80
percent of social-security spending seems merely to redistribute income (in a “mechanical” sense)
over the life cycle of the individual (Fölster, 1995).4
the general equilibrium effects of taxes and benefits on factor income,
via various behavioral adjustments - and that these effects have turned
out to be difficult to calculate empirically. There is, however, some
supporting evidence; for example, in most countries, the factor-income
distribution among citizens in active working age did not become more
uneven when today's welfare-state arrangements were being built up
during the first decades after World War II.
It is, however, important to emphasize that these various rationales
for building up welfare-state arrangements do not, by themselves, explain
why these arrangements have actually been made.  Such explanations
would require an analysis of the political processes that have generated
these outcomes.  Moreover, the achievements referred to above do not
mean that the specific forms of the welfare-state arrangements in various
OECD countries have been particularly efficient; in fact, the opposite is
often the case, as will be discussed below.
The most widely discussed problem with welfare-state
arrangements probably concerns the "static" efficiency costs associated
with the financing of the welfare-state, and hence with various tax
wedges - often measured by the "marginal costs of public funds".
3 My
only point on this well-known issue would be to emphasize the
pervasiveness of such disincentive effects. In addition to frequently
studied (substitution) effects against hours of work, and somewhat less
frequently studied effects on private saving and investment in physical
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per dollar of additional spending, which means that higher government spending can be motivated if
it is believed to be worth more than 1.2-1.3 dollars to society per extra dollar spent.  By contrast, in
Sweden during the 1980s, the marginal costs of public funds have been estimated at two or three
dollars, or even as high as seven dollars in special cases.  Calculations of the marginal costs of
public funds in Sweden after the 1991 tax reform give considerably lower figures, often less than 1.5
percent.  Because of the limited domain of such analyses, in terms of the number of decisions
studied, and also because of the methodological difficulties involved, we should probably regard
calculations like these as experiments in quantification rather than as reliable estimates.5
capital, it is also important to consider the effects on, for instance, do-it-
yourself work, barter of goods and services, the intensity and quality of
work, investment in human capital, the choice of job, the allocation of
investment in real and human capital, tax avoidance and tax evasion.
Unfortunately, our knowledge of these matters is fragmented, sometimes
even anecdotal; this does not, however, mean that it is without value.
Distortions that are directly connected with welfare-state benefits
are probably no less pervasive. Not only are means-tested benefits bound
to create "benefit wedges", i.e., implicit tax wedges, including poverty
traps. The most severe problem inherent in various benefit systems is
probably that, like private insurance, they are plagued with moral hazard
because the individual is able to adjust his own behavior to qualify for
benefits. Outright "benefit-cheating" is also bound to occur. Among
major welfare-state arrangements, problems of moral hazard and cheating
seem to be particularly pervasive in the case of sick benefits, work-injury
benefits, economic support to single parents (read: mothers), subsidized
early retirement (disability pensions), and unemployment benefits. On
these matters, we have plenty of empirical indications that substantial
effects have emerged. The number of beneficiaries will tend to rise by
with? the generosity of the benefits due to moral hazard and cheating.
4
                                          
4  Some figures from Sweden may illustrate the issue. For instance, in the 1980s, when the
replacement ratio in the sick-benefit system in Sweden was 90 percent of previous income (up to a
ceiling), people stayed away from work for alleged sickness about 23 days per year on average. In
connection with lower compensation levels and stricter social control (after employers took over the
payments of benefits for the first two weeks), the number of sick days has fallen dramatically,
probably by nearly a half. The deep recession in the early 1990s also appears to have contributed to
this development.
When the replacement ratio in the work-injury system was raised to 100 percent in the early
1980s, and administrative controls were relaxed, government spending for work-injury insurance
increased by a factor of four in real terms within a few years; a usual judgement is that changes in
administrative controls were more important than the rise in the compensation level.  Moreover,
about 20 percent of all households with children are one-parent households in Sweden, which is a
rather normal figure in north-western Europe (cf. UNICEF; UN; and US Bureau of Labor Statistics
referred to in The Economist, September 9, 1995, p. 22). The number of individuals with subsidized
early retirement (originally designed for disabled persons) was already about 8 percent of the labor
force in Sweden in the 1980s - long before full employment broke down.  In some countries that
have suffered from high unemployment for a long period, the figure is even higher, such as in the6
II. Dynamic achievements
Rather than dwelling on "static" aspects like these, I would like to
concentrate on incentive effects of a more dynamic nature, in the sense
that most effects accumulate only gradually, and that they interact
strongly with other factors over time, possibly in the form of virtuous or
vicious circles.
Starting with dynamic achievements, it is likely that government
subsidies to investment in human capital result not only in a rise in the
future level of GNP, but also in faster long-term GNP growth, as asserted
by contemporary theories of "endogenous growth". This would be
expected to be the case not only for education and general health care,
but also for policies that mitigate child poverty and provide specific
social services like pre-natal care and better nutrition for mothers and
children. Indeed, the effects of improvements in these fields seem to be
transmitted over generations within the family; see Haveman and Wolfe
(1993).
Another potentially important dynamic contribution of welfare-
state arrangements is to bring various minority groups into ordinary
labor-market activities, and hence to mitigate what is often called "social
exclusion", manifested in long-term open unemployment, withdrawal
from the labor force, or highly unstable and uncertain job prospects. This
contribution presupposes that long-term benefit dependency can be
avoided, which is more likely to succeed if the policy relies on work-
oriented welfare-state arrangements, so-called "workfare", than on pure
                                                                                                                                  
Netherlands and Italy.  By contrast, generous compensation levels for the unemployed, amounting
until recently to 90 percent of the previous wage in Sweden, was not a serious problem as long as
unemployment was very low.  But it became a problem when total unemployment (open
unemployment plus individuals taken care of by the Labor Market Board), went up to 10-13 percent
in the early 1990s.7
transfer payments. As an illustration, the main reason for the high and
long-term dependency on income transfers among single mothers in the
United States is probably not that these benefits are particularly
generous, but rather that they are not consistently and effectively
combined with requirements for work or education - and organized child
care.
Policies that counteract “social exclusion” may also, in long-term
perspective mitigate the development of cultures of criminal behavior
such as street crime, burglary, physical violence and drug addiction; cf.
Hagen (1994).  Poor labor-force attachment is, in fact, often regarded as
a key factor that embeds crimes in poor neighborhoods, cf. Wilson
(1987). Indeed, it is, often argued that the more ambitious welfare-state
arrangements in Western Europe than in the United States help explain
the smaller incidence of such phenomena in the former; cf. Coder,
Rainwater and Sweeding ( 1989); Jäntti and Danziger ( 1994).
The emergence of long-term dynamic effects such as these was
already a basic notion in Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma ( 1944,
Appendix 3), where he emphasized the possibilities of what he called
positive (or negative) processes of "cumulative causation" between
variables such as "employment, wages, housing, nutrition, clothing,
health, education, stability in family relations, manners, cleanliness,
orderliness, trustworthiness, law observance, loyalty to society at large,
absence of criminality, and so on".
Both long-term productivity-enhancing welfare-state policies and
policy actions that stimulate labor-force participation in the private
sector, for instance among married women and various minority groups,8
also tend to expand the tax base in the long run, which helps finance the
welfare state in the first place - an obvious example of a virtuous circle.
5
It has also been argued that an even distribution of income
mitigates social conflicts (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994), and that it tends to
reduce the political pressure to redistribute disposable income further by
way of distortionary political interventions (Meltzer and Scott, 1981;
Persson and Tabellini, 1994). Another common view is also that welfare-
state arrangements make citizens more willing to accept reallocation of
resources in response to changes in technology, product demand and
international competition - and even contribute to making citizens more
sympathetic to the market system.
Several of these asserted dynamic consequences of welfare-state
arrangements may be regarded as improvements in the system of property
rights, in the sense of assuring private agents that they can retain a large
and stable fraction of the return to their own effort (Rebelo, 1991;
Cashin, 1995). Of course, the taxes that finance the welfare-state, in
particular unpredicted changes in the tax rules, have effects on property
rights in the opposite direction.
Welfare-state policies may also have profound long-term
consequences for the role of the family in society. Some family-oriented
welfare states on the European continent tend to support the traditional
family, in the sense that married women are encouraged to work in their
homes rather than in the open market. Examples of such countries are
Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and to a considerable extent also
Germany.
The consequences for the labor-force participation of married
women are more complex in "individual-centered" welfare states, e.g., in
                                          
5 For recent emphasis on positive interrelations between social achievements and economic
efficiency, see, for instance, Glyn and Miliband (1994).9
the Nordic countries.
6 It is unavoidable that high marginal tax rates
create substitution effects in favor of household work, i.e., against work
in the open market. But incentives in the opposite direction are created
by subsidies to care of children, the sick and the elderly outside the
household, i.e., positive cross-substitution effects of the provision of
such services on labor supply. In some countries, labor-force
participation of married women is also stimulated by separate assessment
of income taxes on husband and wife, which lowers the marginal income
tax rate for the “second” income earner in the household.  Another
example is positive “liquidity effects” on labor supply due to a
combination of high average tax rates and the provision of benefits “in
kind" that cannot be transformed into money income, which often makes
it difficult to finance the family on the basis of one income earner only.
Labor supply in some countries is also enhanced by tying the individual '
s right to social benefits to work - to previous work in the case of
pensions, sickness benefits and paid maternity leave, to current work in
the case of subsidized child care, and to the willingness of the individual
to be available for future job offers in the case of unemployment benefits
and social assistance.
It is, of course, a question of values whether we are in favor of
family-oriented or individual-oriented welfare states - or if we prefer, in
conformity with non-paternalistic principles, to opt for welfare-state
arrangements that are intended to be neutral with respect to the division
of labor between household work and market activities, and to the
division of work between family members.
All this means that the welfare-state has quite ambiguous
consequences for the labor market. In countries with a combination of
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high marginal tax and benefit wedges and strict work requirements,
labor-force participation may very well be high, in particular for married
women, but the average number of working hours per year of individuals
may be rather low, in particular if the benefit systems are far from
actuarially fair.
7 Strongly subsidized child care and old-age care may also
result in a high birth rate in such societies - even for highly educated
females.
III. Dynamic problems
The "dynamic achievement" of the modern welfare state discussed
above should, of course, be compared with various "dynamic problems".
For instance, the positive effects of subsidies on investment in human
capital are counteracted by the reduced return on such investment
because of the marginal tax and benefit wedges on labor income. The
more progressive the tax system, the greater the probability that the net
effect of these conflicting forces will be negative.
There appears to be broad agreement that high marginal tax wedges
on the return on physical assets - in the absence of full loss-offset - will
also reduce the accumulation of such assets. A more important point is
perhaps that high marginal tax rates on capital tend to distort  the
allocation of capital on different uses, because of the asymmetries of the
taxation of different types of assets and asset holders that characterize
the tax system in all countries. High tax rates create a strong leverage in
these asymmetries. It is, by contrast, often argued that policies with
negative effects on domestic saving do not harm domestic investment in
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physical assets in a world with free international capital mobility. This is,
I believe, a mistaken view. One reason is that there seems to be a home
bias regarding the supply of funds to physical investment, in the sense
that foreign saving is not a perfect substitute for domestic saving when it
comes to the financing of domestic investment. In particular, it is likely
that small and medium-sized firms are favored by domestically supplied
financial capital - equity capital as well as loans - because of various
information problems in capital and credit markets. For instance,
providers of financial capital require detailed knowledge of the
entrepreneurs to whom they supply funds, and this knowledge is difficult
to acquire “by long distance”. Moreover, private entrepreneurs, probably
particularly small ones, are likely to have preferences for capital that is
controlled either by themselves or by people whom they know. Thus,
both capital taxes that deter private incentives to save, and welfare-state
arrangements that reduce the need for household saving, would be
expected to thwart the entry and growth of small private firms - also in
countries with free international capital mobility.  As a result, the level
of GNP can be expected to fall, as will its rate of growth at least during a
period of transition to a new steady-state growth path. Capitalism
requires capitalists and these will emerge only if there is domestic private
saving.
More wide-ranging dynamic problems may also arise in connection
with welfare-state policies. I have hypothesized elsewhere (Lindbeck,
1995 ; and Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull, 1995) that full realization of
various disincentive effects of taxes and benefits is likely to be delayed
because habits and social norms, at least for a while, constrain individual
behavior. In this sense, social norms function as a form of “social
capital”. Before the buildup of generous welfare-state arrangements,
work and saving were crucial for the living standard of the individual,12
indeed often even for his survival. It may be hypothesized that today's
habits and social norms are, at least partly, a result of incentive and
control systems in the past. But as increased marginal tax and benefit
wedges have recently reduced the return on work, and made individual
saving less imperative, it is likely that habits and social norms have
gradually adjusted to the new incentive system. To begin with a few
(“entrepreneurial”) individuals may start breaking previous norms. As
more and more individuals abandon previously obeyed social norms, the
easier it will be for others to follow suit. In other words, it may be
hypothesized that the social nature of norms contributes to a dynamic
process by which different individuals gradually adjust their behavior to
a new incentive structure, as norms are abandoned. If these delayed
effects are not anticipated by politicians when welfare-state arrangements
are established, the welfare state will easily "overshoot", in the sense that
the disincentive effects will become greater than politicians would have
tolerated initially (Lindbeck, 1994a).
It is also important to avoid the naïve belief that all types of social
problems and conflicts can be effectively mitigated by welfare-state
arrangements.  Today, even the most advanced welfare states experience
- indeed often increasingly so - pockets of poverty, social problems in
connection with unemployment, unstable family relations, brutal urban
environments, drug abuse, crime, etc.
Certain kinds of economic crimes are even enhanced by high
marginal tax rates. The reason is, of course, that the return to economic
crimes is usually tax exempt, which means that honesty becomes
"expensive" in high-tax societies. This is bound to result in a long-term
deterioration in the supply of honesty, which is an important collective
capital good in society - another example of “social capital” which will
depreciate if the incentive to keep it up deteriorates. As a result, some13
citizens (with weaker social norms than others) will certainly be tempted
to cheat on taxes or benefits, work in the underground economy or even
commit outright economic crimes. This is another example of how
induced changes in social norms may, over time, create serious problems
for the welfare state: an initially rather honest civilization may become
increasingly dishonest because of the increased costs of honesty. I am
afraid that this has already begun to happen in the high-tax Nordic
countries in recent decades.
I hypothesized above that some welfare-state arrangements may
raise the acceptance among citizens of continuing reallocation of labor.
Nevertheless, we may note that resistance to such reallocations often
emerges also in advanced welfare states. Indeed, generous benefits mean
that people may choose to stay were they are rather than shift to other
jobs and geographical locations. We cannot even be sure that reductions
in income inequality, when brought about by policy actions, will always
mitigate political pressure for further redistributions through taxes,
transfers and regulations.  The “appetite” for redistributions may even
increase by the amount of redistributions implemented earlier.  A reason
may be that such policy actions tend to politicize distributional issues,
and make people believe that income differences are “arbitrarily”
determined in the political process, rather than constituting an
indispensable element of a well-functioning market system.  This is, in
fact, my own interpretation of the Swedish experience of redistribution
policy after World War II. It would seem that the political discussion in
Sweden has increasingly focused on remaining inequalities, and the
demands to reduce them, regardless of how small they have become.
Thus, the often asserted negative relation between income inequality and
distributional conflicts may not be monotone.  However, this observation14
may not be a general pattern in the political process; the US experience
may be a counterexample.
The possibilities of the emergence of such hazardous dynamics
mean that viscous circles, and not just virtuous ones, may be generated
by welfare-state arrangements. If the viscous ones, at some point in time,
start to dominate, the welfare state may be undermined in the long run
due to a combination of exploding welfare-state spending and an erosion
of the tax base. A basic dilemma of the welfare state is exactly this: the
more "humane" it tries to be, the greater is the risk that it undermines its
own economic foundations in the long-run, and that it will not be able to
live up to its promises.
The economic problems of the welfare state have, of course, been
accentuated by the slowdown of long-term GDP growth during the last
two decades and by higher life expectancy - both of which may have been
boosted by the welfare state itself. We also know that the welfare- state
crisis became acute in some countries in the 1980s and early 1990s in
connection with strongly negative, short-term macroeconomic shocks,
which threw large groups of citizens onto various safety nets, and
induced others to withdraw from the labor force. These developments
may also have speeded up the long-term weakening of social norms
against living on various types of benefits (Lindbeck, 1995).
If this is correct, it is important to take the warnings about the risk
of delayed disincentive effects seriously.  The problem is rather similar
to environmental disturbances, which often also build up gradually with
delayed effects. In both cases - the welfare state as well as the
environment - the conclusion must be that the risks of seriously delayed
and partly irreversible damage, should make us cautious.
IV Lessons for would-be welfare states15
What, then, are the most important lessons for would-be welfare
states - including both former socialist states, the so-called FSS
countries, and middle-income countries outside Europe? These lessons
have to be formulated, of course, against the background of both the
previous welfare-state arrangements in these countries and the social
problems that exist today.
Prior to their collapse, the socialist countries provided often quite
elaborate "cradle-to-grave" welfare states. Administration of these
benefits, however, was often closely tied to the employment contract -
partly by job guarantees, partly by employment-related benefits,
including generous family benefits of various types (Krumm, Milanovic
and Walton, 1994; Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992; Barr, 1994).
Subsidies and direct provision of goods and services were frequently also
tied to firms. Such arrangements are obviously not conducive to an
emerging market system, as firms are then unable to give employment
guarantees or easily finance social spending. It is also difficult to create a
flexible labor market when benefits are tied to specific firms.
It, therefore, seems natural that the governments in these countries
have gradually taken over more of both the financing and the
administration of welfare-arrangements. Indeed, as unemployment
benefits and social assistance hardly existed during the socialist period,
such systems had to be constructed largely from scratch.
Several countries in Latin America also build up rather generous
welfare states during the first decade after World War II (or even earlier).
Often, however, the systems turned out to be unsustainable; cf. Mesa-
Lago (1994).  This has shown up in huge imbalances between revenues
and spending in the social security systems in various years, and in
expected aggregate actuarial imbalances of the systems over an extended
future time span - a result of the tensions between the generosity of these16
benefit systems and the limited economic resources of the countries
concerned.
The "dependency rate" of the benefit systems - i.e., the ratio of
individuals living on transfers to those living on factor income - is often
about the same in the FSS countries and in several middle-income
countries outside Europe. The proportion of citizens above the age of 60
or 65, however, is usually much higher in the FSS countries. Indeed, this
proportion today is about as high as in most OECD countries, where the
ratio between the number of individuals of working age and pensioners is
often as low as about two, and is likely to fall even further in coming
decades. A low retirement age in the FSS countries during the socialist
period - often 60 years for men and 55 for women - has accentuated the
problem. This means that welfare-state spending in these countries is to a
large extent directed towards consumption for the elderly rather than
towards investment in human capital among the young. The situation is
quite different in several middle-income countries outside Europe, in
particular in Pacific Asia, where the elderly, so far, comprise a much
smaller fraction of the entire population.
When drawing on the OECD experience, it is important to recall
that the generous welfare-state arrangements in these countries emerged
only after about a century of successful economic growth. It is not self-
evident that these countries would have been equally rich today if they
had tried to set up comprehensive and generous welfare-state
arrangements during the first decades of this century.  These
arrangements were also, to begin with, quite selective, i.e., strongly
targeted, before comprehensive and “universal” welfare states were
established after World War II.  Therefore, it is probably prudent for
builders of future welfare states to limit their ambitions during the
coming decades - not only so as to finance the systems, but also to avoid17
serious disincentive effects during the early phases of their economic
development.
It is also interesting to note that the recently successful economies
in Pacific Asia, in terms of economic growth, have waited quite a long
time before even contemplating the construction of elaborate welfare-
state arrangements. One important reason why this has been feasible is,
of course, that extended families are still an important source of income
security in these countries.
There are, however, a strong case for building up, or improving,
welfare-state arrangements today also in middle-income countries,
including the FSS-countries. The political forces that work in that
direction are also strong. The most important positive lesson from the
welfare-state experience in the OECD countries may be drawn from the
above- mentioned achievements in terms of economic security and the
mitigation of poverty. When trying to transmit this experience to would-
be welfare states, it is important, however, to get the priorities "right"
from the beginning. A trade-off certainly exists between increasing
economic security for the majority, on the one hand, and mitigating
poverty for a minority, on the other hand. Income security for the
majority may be important for political stability, as well as for a wide
acceptance of continuing adjustments of relative wages to efficiency
criteria. Ethical considerations instead motivate a concentration of
resources on relieving the poverty of those who are worst off in society.
Moreover, many observers of conditions in middle-income countries
today probably agree that both these ambitions are more important than
equalizing the overall distribution of income, as measured, for instance,
by the Gini coefficient. Both ethical considerations and concern for
social and political stability provide arguments for avoiding small groups
of citizens becoming rich on socially dubious activities. To mitigate this18
problem requires, however, actions outside the area of welfare-state
arrangements.
A special problem when trying to safeguard the incomes of the
poorest segments of the population in the FSS countries is that the
difference between the minimum benefits required to avoid severe
poverty, and the lowest wages in society, tends to be very small in such
countries. For instance, while the ratio of minimum wages to the social-
assistance income level is often two, three or even four in the OECD
countries, it is not much higher than unity in some FSS countries
(Krumm et al. 1994, Table 2).
It is hazardous to suggest designs for the buildup of welfare-state
arrangements in the middle-income countries. On the basis of experience
in various OECD-countries, and the situation that exists today in various
middle-income countries, it may, however, be a good idea for these
countries to concentrate, at least to begin with, on four types of welfare-
state arrangements:
(i) Strictly targeted support for the poor, in the form of means-
tested social assistance, partly perhaps "in kind" to limit the negative
effects on work. A basic reason for this proposal is, of course, that such
support is rather inexpensive.
(ii) A rather low safety net in the form of flat-rate benefits tied to
specific contingencies such as sickness, work injury, unemployment and
old age. Again, a reason for the proposal is that it is important to limit
the financial costs for the government. Another reason is to limit the
risks of serious disincentive problems, in particular in a long-run
perspective.
(iii) Subsidies of services with strong elements of investment in
human capital, such as prenatal care, maternity care and education - in
particular for low-income groups. A main reason is, of course, to19
stimulate economic growth, but also in the case of human capital
investment for low-productivity groups, to improve the position of these.
and
(iv) Temporary, rather than permanent, support for the unemployed,
in the form of once-and-for-all severance pay when employees are laid
off, assistance for individuals to become self employed or start small
firms, temporary public works programs, and temporary training
programs tied to firms, instead of relying on permanent measures such as
regular public-sector employment, public- works programs of long
duration, or early retirement. A rationale for this proposal is, of course,
to avoid permanent expansion of public-sector employment and to
mitigate tendencies to unemployment persistence.
As total government spending already hovers around 50 percent of
GNP both in several FSS countries and in some Latin American
countries, i.e., somewhat above the OECD average, it may even be
advisable to wind down some benefit programs.  The reason is not only to
avoid financial difficulties for the public sector.  Another reason is that
quite strong incentives to work, save and invest may be necessary now in
order to restore economically and socially efficiently behavior of
individuals in some of these countries - in particular as it is likely that
habits and norms have already been seriously damaged due to the poor
incentive system in these countries during recent decades. It may also be
particularly important to keep marginal tax rates rather low so as to
combat the severe problems of economic crime.
Moreover, the truism that capitalism requires capitalists, and hence
also private saving, is particularly important in the FSS countries, as
there is very little accumulated private saving. It is, therefore, important
that the new welfare-state arrangements in these countries are20
constructed in ways that do not harm private saving more than
"necessary".
V. Marginal reforms
Reforms and retreats of various welfare-state arrangements are
under way in several OECD countries. The reform debate in these
countries is also of interest for would-be welfare states. Let me start with
what may be called "marginal" reforms, subsequently shifting the focus
to more "radical" reforms. The former often aim at making the systems
less generous, largely to avoid moral hazard and cheating, as well as to
make the arrangements financially sustainable in a long-term perspective,
while radical reforms aim at overhauling the basic structure of the
welfare-state arrangements.
The most obvious marginal reform is perhaps to reduce benefit
levels - not only in order to improve the financial position of the
government, but also to provide coinsurance, in order to mitigate moral
hazard and to restore economic incentives.  Stronger actuarial elements
in social security systems also provide a natural way improving economic
incentives, as (implicit) marginal tax wedge would then be reduced.  It is
important to note that strong actuarial elements are feasible also in the
context of pay-as-you-go systems, by tying future benefits to the value of
previously paid contributions.  Such actuarial, contributions-defined pay-
as-you-go systems are perhaps easiest to achieve for old age and early
retirement pensions.
8
Nevertheless some distortions are unavoidable in all compulsory
systems, even in actuarially fair ones; the individual is forced to
                                          
8  In a system of work-injury benefits, actuarial elements may be introduced by varying the
contributions from firms in accordance with work-injury risks (“experience rating.”)  In the
unemployment benefit system, actuarial elements may be instituted by differentiating the fees by
sectors and professions in accordance with unemployment risks.21
postpone his consumption, which means that the government tries to
force the individual to act in accordance with a lower discount rate than
his own subjective rate. If capital markets are not perfect, the result is a
negative substitution effect on labor supply, even in the case of an
otherwise actuarially fair, compulsory system. The reason is simply that
the individual does not value promised future benefits as high as he
values the forced consumption loss today, and this distortion is
equivalent to a marginal tax wedge on work.
9 The distortion of labor
supply in an actuarially fair system is smaller, however, than the
corresponding distortion in a nonactuarial system even when the systems
are compulsory.
10
Another problem in several countries is that individuals tend to
shift between different benefit systems depending on which is the most
favorable. It is, therefore, useful to have the same replacement level in all
benefit systems, between which the individual can move at his own
discretion - such as the sick-leave, work-injury, early retirement or
unemployment benefit systems. Strict eligibility requirements for
receiving benefits, and stiff controls that these requirements are satisfied,
are also important, though the need for controls is smaller, the lower the
benefit levels.  There are, of course, practical limits to controls, which
are probably more effective against cheating than against moral hazard.
To avoid overinsurance, it is also useful to put caps on total
insurance benefits, i.e., on the total level of compulsory plus private
insurance benefits. Otherwise, the compulsory system will be exposed to
negative external effects by moral hazard and cheating in the voluntary
system. Such caps are not necessary in the old-age pension system,
however, as moral hazard hardly arises in this case.
                                          
9  Peter Diamond (1995) has emphasized (indeed overemphasiszed) this point.
10  See Hassler and Lindbeck (1995).22
Another important problem is how to construct welfare-state
arrangements that are reasonably robust to shocks due to demographic
factors or productivity growth. A basic problem in this connection is the
extent to which such adjustments should be automatic or discretionary.
11
In a pension system, for instance, an obvious method to achieve
automatic adjustments to demographic changes is to tie the normal
pension age to the life expectancy of the population. In order to provide a
pension system with automatic protection against a slowdown in
productivity growth, the pension benefits can be formally tied to the per
capita disposable income, or per capita consumption of the active
population; see Merton (1983).
Similar automatic adjustment mechanisms may also be constructed
for other parts of a social security system. For instance, either the
contributions or the benefits of an unemployment insurance system may
be automatically tied to the unemployment rate.  In a sick-pay system, the
contributions and benefits may be formally tied to the number of sick
days in the population as a whole, etc. There are, of course, limits to such
automatic adjustments of benefit levels if we are anxious to avoid
creating severe hardship for some individuals.
Automatic adjustments have the advantage of being more
predictable, and perhaps also politically easier to implement, than
discretionary adjustments. In other words, automatic adjustment
mechanisms may reduce the risk for discretionary political interventions
in the rules of benefit systems, i.e., "political risks" may be mitigated. It
also becomes easier to keep the systems outside the yearly budget
process, which is also likely to reduce the frequency of political
intervention in the rules. A weakness of automatic adjustment
                                          
11  This issue is discussed in Diamond (1995).23
mechanisms of this aggregate type is, of course, that they may make it
difficult to establish a tight "actuarial" relation between contributions
and benefits for the individual. Relative benefits for different individuals
could, however, still be tied to previously paid contributions, even if
average benefits are tied to the average disposable income (consumption)
of the contemporary working population.
Incentive problems also extend to the case of the provision of
social services, in the sense that it has turned out to be difficult to
achieve efficiency while simultaneously guaranteeing freedom of choice
when the government provides such services. The obvious way of dealing
with this problem is either administrative reforms of public- sector
agencies or the opening up of competition with private and cooperative
institutions. The first option includes methods such as administrative
decentralization, cash limits, better measurement of performance, and
comparison of the performance of different units in the public sector (i.e.,
"benchmark competition"). The second option requires free entry and an
end to the discrimination of actual and potential competitors to public-
sector agencies.  To avoid distributional problems in connection with
freer competition, a voucher system is perhaps the most obvious device.
Would-be welfare states should consider options like these at an
early stage.  It has turned out to be politically difficult to achieve the
twofold objective of reforming the operation of government agencies and
letting in competition, after the production of such services has already
been monopolized by public-sector agencies. Serious protests from
public-sector employees are more likely as a response to cuts in existing
services and employment than to restrains in the implementation of such
services in the first place.
VI. Radical reforms24
The considerations above focused on marginal reforms within an
approximately given structure of welfare-state arrangements. More
recently, however, there has also been some discussion of radical
reforms, i.e., changes in the basic structure of the welfare state. That
discussion may also be of interest for would-be welfare states. Indeed, it
should be easier to choose between alternative structures when a system
is being built up, than to reform an old system to which people have
already adjusted their lives. After all, social security systems are implicit
long-term contracts between the government and the citizens and the
political and social costs of breaking these contracts may, as we know, be
very high.
Examples of recently proposed radical alternatives are (i) to replace
a system of income protection with a safety net that is common to all
(flat-rate benefits), or vice versa; (ii) to shift from a pay-as-you-go to a
funded social insurance system, possibly combined with partial or total
privatization, while keeping insurance compulsory; (iii) to replace a
complex social security system, in benefits are tied to specific
contingencies, with a “negative income-tax” (a so-called “gradient
system”); or (iv) to replace a traditional social security system with
actuarially based lifetime ”drawing rights”, i.e., forced-saving accounts,
whereby an individual is free to draw, at his own discretion, on an
individual account, which is comprised of compulsory fees accumulated
over his working-life.
Each of these radical reforms has specific advantages and
drawbacks. A shift to a common safety net, i.e., the "back to Beveridge
strategy", has the advantage of being financially inexpensive for the
government. Such a system is also attractive if we want the individual
himself to take considerable responsibility in the form of voluntary
saving and insurance policies, which is often believed to reduce the risk25
that individuals will become pacified. The types of welfare-state benefits
for which this type of arrangement would be feasible are the transfer
programs rather than a service program such as health-care. A
disadvantage of this strategy is, of course, that the administrative costs
will often be higher than in existing social security systems.
Funded systems not only have the advantage of being (more or less)
actuarially fair, which means that wide tax wedges are avoided; they also
have a favorable effect on aggregate national saving, at least during a
period of transition. It is also reasonable to assume that property rights
are stronger in funded systems than in a pay-as-you-go system, in the
sense that the political risks would be expected to be smaller, even
though individuals would, of course, instead be exposed to more capital-
market risks.  In terms of an important concept in social psychology, the
hypothesis is here that the political risks are smaller if the benefits are
“???” in terms of the rights to accumulated saving in funds, rather than
more abstract rights to transfers that are paid by others  .
In addition to well-known transition problems, a government-
implemented funded system also raises the difficult issue of who should
administrate and control the funds. It is theoretically possible for the
funds to be managed in such a way that their managers, and hence also
politicians and public-sector bureaucrats, do not interfere in either
allocation of the assets or control of the firms in which the funds are
invested.  Theoretically it may, for instance, be possible to legislate that
the funds should hold "market portfolios", or invest only in mutual
funds.
12
But it is extremely naïve to believe that future politicians will
necessarily stick to such rules. They can simply amend legislation in the
                                          
12  This has been suggested by, for instance, Peter Diamond, 1995.26
future so as to control the composition of the funds and/or to exert power
over firms. There are, in other words, severe risks that a funded,
government-operated social security system will, in reality, sooner or
later develop into a system with strong government control of both
capital markets and individual firms. It is much easier for politicians to
use an instrument that already exists, i.e., government-created funds, to
exercise power over firms, than to engage in "open" socialization with
the explicit purpose of taking control of the private sector.
The Swedish experience is instructive from this point of view.
When the supplementary pension system was introduced in Sweden in
1959, it was explicitly stated that the buffer funds created by the new
system should not be used to buy shares in private firms. Nevertheless,
new decisions have been taken over the years to do just that. Moreover,
Swedish politicians have not chosen index funds or mutual funds, and the
government-appointed boards of the funds have, in fact, used the voting
rights of the shares held by the buffer funds to intervene in firms. From
time to time, politicians and labor union leaders have also suggested that
the pension funds should be used as instruments for centralized
“industrial policies”.
Those who want to limit the risk of future socialization of firms,
therefore, have good reason to object to a shift to a government-operated
funded social-security system.  This warning should be of particular
interest for the FSS countries, as the citizens in these countries may be
particularly anxious not to wind up in a socialist system again, after
recently having escaped such a society.
What about a shift to a negative income tax, which is a popular idea
among many economists? A main advantage would be that extremely
high implicit marginal tax rates, i.e., poverty traps, may then be avoided
for low-income earners. But such a system is very expensive because of27
the thickness of the left tail in the factor-income distribution in most
countries, which requires quite high tax rates on the rest of the
population. As a result, the marginal tax distortions would simply move
up along the income distribution, which may create more problems than
it solves.
There is, however, an even more serious problem with a negative
income tax. It may create new generations of "drifters", living on
government handouts, as the benefits in such systems in fact constitute
"individual rights", rather than serving as income support based on
specific contingencies. A negative income tax may, over time, result in a
demise of habits and social norms that enhance work and saving, for
instance among the young generation - even more so than social security
systems in which the benefits are tied to well-defined contingencies.
(Lindbeck, 1995) Considering that the FSS countries have been plagued
with serious incentive problems for decades, it would seem that a shift to
a negative income tax would be even more hazardous in these countries
that in the rich OECD countries.
A system of drawing rights, finally, would allow the individual to
draw on an account in the public sector for well-defined contingencies,
for instance, in connection with education, training, sickness or
unemployment, though less would then be available later on, ultimately
for pensions (Fölster, 1995).  An advantage of such a system, if it is
made strongly actuarial, is that it helps keep down marginal tax wedges.
However, such a system requires, complementary risk insurance, as
different individuals are exposed to quite different risks - sickness,
permanent invalidism, unemployment, etc. It would also be necessary to
put a strict ceiling on how much the individual is allowed to draw before
retirement age - to avoid myopic behavior and free-riding. From the point
of view of economic incentives, the main advantage of a system with28
drawing rights, as compared to an actuarially fair pay-as-you-go system,
seems to be that the less an individual has used other social systems
earlier in his life, the higher his pension. In this way, a system of drawing
rights pools accumulated saving for different types of contingencies, and
hence also increases the freedom of choice for the individual.
Experiences in Singapore and Malaysia suggest that a system of this type
is at least administratively feasible.
VI. In conclusion
When welfare-state arrangements are constructed or reformed, it is
important to find a proper combination of redistribution, insurance and
incentives, as well as to choose a system that is reasonably robust to
economic, demographic and political risks. In view of these complex
considerations, it is natural that recent radical welfare-state proposals
have included combinations of different elements. The most celebrated
combination is perhaps a "three-pillared system" consisting of: (i) tax-
financed flat-rate benefits, i.e., a safety net, at the "bottom" for well-
defined contingencies such as sickness, unemployment and old age -
combined with discretionary social assistance for people, who, for
various reasons, cannot support themselves; (ii) a supplementary system
of mandatory social insurance designed for income-protection, with
strong actuarial elements in order to minimize tax wedges - possibly also
some funding, provided it is possible to guarantee both individual
ownership of the assets and privatization of the funds; and, finally, (iii)
voluntary saving and voluntary insurance policies “at the top”, which
may include both collective and individual insurance. The first pillar,
which may be strongly redistributive, need not be institutionally separate
from the second, more actuarial, pillar; the two may be administratively
combined.29
A three-pillared system of this type would pool political risks and
market risks. This is perhaps as much economic security as can be
achieved in an uncertain world. To bring this about, however, requires
not only profound economic analysis, proper insurance techniques and
competent administration. It also, and perhaps above all, requires a good
understanding of political behavior. This is the case both when we try to
understand how the present welfare-state problems have arisen, and when
we consider reforms to mitigate these problems.
For instance, while the huge expansion of welfare-state spending
after World War II certainly reflects high and rising demand among
citizens for economic security and redistributions, the process cannot be
fully understood without insights into the process of competition for
votes among political parties. A traditional view of this issue is, of
course, that government spending is stimulated by the fact that benefits
are usually specific, while the financing of them is usually general. This
view of the political process also helps explain why it is difficult to
rewind government spending later on, in particular if individuals have
already adjusted their behavior, indeed their lives, to the benefit systems.
An extreme example is a country where the majority of the electorate, as
in Belgium, Norway and Sweden today, is tax financed - either by living
on transfers or by being employed in government-service production. Is
this a point of no return?
For these various reasons reforms and retreats of the welfare state
may be extremely difficult - that is, if the country is not blessed with
politicians with “suicidal instincts”, or if a serious financial crisis in the
government does not “force” politicians to reform and reduce welfare-
state spending. A large "package" of several simultaneous spending and
tax cuts may also be easier to implement than a series of specific reforms,
as in the former case everybody would be a winner on some accounts and30
a loser on others. Indeed, if the package is large, it may even be
impossible to identify winners and losers. This probably helps to cut
government spending, and hence to prevent a more serious crisis for the
welfare state in the future.  Hence, (to many hence!) my proposals have
been designed, not to abolish the welfare state, but rather to make it
sustainable in a long-term perspective.31
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